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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 1985 General Motors entered into an agreement with the
United Auto Workers (UAW) setting forth the terms and conditions of
a future automobile facility, known as the Saturn Corporation, in
Spring Hill, Tennessee. General Motors and the UAW view this project
as an unprecedented achievement in "union-management partner-
ship."1 The goal of the Saturn project is to maintain General Motors'
viability as a domestic enterprise through an agreement to build a new
subcompact car in the United States. This partnership between the cor-
poration and the UAW will include employee participation and en-
hanced job security.2 Faced with mounting competition from overseas
* Throughout the Special Project, this piece is cited as Special Project Note, Mandatory and
Permissive Subjects.
1. Advice Memorandum Issued by the NLRB on UAW-GM Saturn Agreement, June 2,
1986, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH) T 20,270, at 33,433 [hereinafter Advice Memorandum].
2. Id.
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and with uncertain prospects in the United States, General Motors
agreed to restructure the workplace in exchange for economic conces-
sions from its employees.' In accordance with a long and productive
collective bargaining relationship,4 General Motors purposefully re-
quested the UAW's input and suggestions in the corporation's economic
decision to relocate its subcompact facility in Tennessee.
The Saturn project illustrates the radical restructuring undertaken
by the American business community in the wake of foreign competi-
tion. General Motors' commitment to protect the job security of its em-
ployees affected by negotiated productivity improvements such as the
decision to relocate, however, is significant for two other interrelated
reasons. First, this action demonstrates that General Motors under-
stood that its employees had little incentive to improve productivity if
doing so would result in fewer jobs.' Second, General Motors' under-
standing of its employees' plight provoked management and labor to
venture beyond the judicially created scope of collective bargaining.'
General Motors, hoping to establish a more competitive and efficient
enterprise, bargained with the UAW over management's en-
trepreneurial decision to relocate. In this cooperative effort, General
Motors and the UAW have turned a blind eye towards the pigeonhole
analysis represented by present labor law and carved out their own ar-
eas of bargaining with respect to terms and conditions of employment,7
3. Schlossberg & Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Coopera-
tion, 37 LAB. L.J. 595, 598 (1986). General Motors and the UAW reached an agreement that in-
cluded a reduction in labor costs in exchange for the development of a Job Opportunity Bank-
Security (JOBS) program to protect employees from being laid off as a result of the introduction of
technology, the contracting out of services, or the negotiation of productivity improvements. The
JOBS program is designed to place and retrain any unit employee who is displaced. Such a pro-
gram represents a commitment by General Motors, as part of its decision to relocate and through
bargaining with the UAW, to prevent unemployment due to alterations in the operation of the
facility. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 33, 481.
4. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 33, 481.
5. Friedman, Negotiated Approaches to Job Security, 36 LAB. L.J. 553, 555 (1985) (part of
the Industrial Relations Research Association Spring Meeting).
6. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); see also infra notes
41-49 and accompanying text.
7. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1982) [hereinafter NLRA]. Section
8(d) of the NLRA establishes the following duty to bargain: "For purposes of this section, to bar-
gain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representa-
tive of the employees to meet at reasonable times, and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. . . ." Id.
In 1935 Congress passed the original NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, which gave em-
ployees the right to organize unions and to bargain collectively with their employers. Wagner Act,
ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1982) (as amended)). The
NLRA was amended in 1947 by the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments), ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 136-38 (1947) [hereinafter LMRA]. In 1959 Congress further
amended the NLRA by passing the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-
Griffin Amendments), Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§ 701(b), 703, 73 Stat. 542 (1959); see also infra notes
578
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based on the real needs and concerns of both management and labor.
The Saturn project is grounded in a mutual respect for collective
bargaining. The modern labor-management relationship, however, is
plagued by uncertainty. The duty to bargain collectively is an integral
part of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), as evidenced
by sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d). s The NLRA attempts to regulate publicly
collective negotiation in order to promote industrial peace between la-
bor and management concerning the basic private conditions of em-
ployment.' Although the NLRA directly addresses the attitude or
respect with which an employer must approach bargaining, the Act is
deplete of any tangible guidance on the scope of issues about which an
employer must bargain.10
As the law of collective bargaining has developed since the passage
of the NLRA, the United States Supreme Court has attempted to de-
fine the scope of bargaining by distinguishing between "mandatory"
and "permissive" subjects of bargaining."' If the Court labels a subject
as mandatory, the employer or union must, at the other's request, bar-
gain in good faith about the subject until an impasse occurs.'2 If the
29-37 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
9. See generally supra Special Project Note, Future Cooperative Efforts; infra Special Pro-
ject Note, Hybrid Employees, at notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
10. The congressional conception of the duty to bargain involved something more than the
mere meeting of an employer with the representatives of his employees; the employer must have
"an open mind and sincere desire to reach an agreement (and] a sincere effort must be made to
reach a common ground." Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. RE V. 1401, 1414
(1958) (quoting in part from NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941)). In order to preserve the openness of the bargaining arrangement, the
founders of the Act wanted to maintain a flexible approach for the determination of bargainable
subjects. "The appropriate scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a formula; it
will inevitably depend upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political climate at any
given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related factors." HR. REP. No. 245,
MINORITY REPORT, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 355, 362 (1948) [hereinafter LMRA HIST.].
11. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 348-50; see infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
12. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-98 (1960). Bargaining to
impasse allows each side to use the economic weapons (e.g., strike and lockout) each possesses
under the NLRA. The Court in Insurance Agents' held that the union's use of a work slowdown to
apply economic pressure did not violate the union's obligation to bargain in good faith. Id. at 495-
96; see NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(3) (1982) (stating that the refusal by the union to bar-
gain in good faith is an unfair labor practice).
The concept of "impasse" refers to the inability of the parties to reach an agreement after
participating in good faith bargaining. Once an employer has bargained to impasse, it legally may
make unilateral changes in working conditions based upon its last offer to the union. NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962). Factors the National Labor Relations Board may consider when
determining whether an impasse has been reached include the parties' good faith, the length of the
negotiations, the parties' bargaining history, and the nature of the issue about which the parties
are unable to agree. See generally 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 634-39 (2d ed. 1983).
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Court determines the subject is nonmandatory, or permissive, both par-
ties must agree to discuss the subject.13 Thus, management may use its
own discretion when acting within permissive areas, without having to
give any consideration to employee interests. 14 Given that the Court has
designated certain subjects as nonmandatory issues within the scheme
of legislatively compelled collective bargaining, the degree of public
protection and regulation of the employer-employee relationship rests
on the content given to the mandatory-permissive dichotomy. 5
Characterizing a subject as mandatory or permissive entails balanc-
ing the interests of both management and labor to determine the
breadth of national labor policy. For example, the Supreme Court's
most recent application of the mandatory-permissive distinction, First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 16 upheld an employer's conten-
tion that certain entrepreneurial decisions should not be subject to
mandatory bargaining even though such decisions may terminate em-
ployees' jobs. The union argued that any decision to alter economically
an employer's business may result in the loss of jobs and is, therefore,
literally a matter that affects "terms and conditions of employment."
According to the union, such a decision is, by definition, within the
duty to bargain as mandated by section 8(d) of the NLRA, and should
be negotiated in good faith.'7 The Court balanced the need to protect
employee interests with the need to protect an employer's ability to
make economic decisions without employee input over matters that are
intimately tied to the operation of an efficient and marketable enter-
prise. "' By labeling the employer's decision as permissive, the Court es-
tablished a strong presumption in favor of an employer's freedom to
make the necessary, economically motivated decisions to run a profita-
ble business.
In light of this precedent, the question arises why General Motors
permitted the UAW to participate in its entrepreneurial decision aimed
at remaining in the subcompact car market through the Saturn project.
Clearly, both General Motors and the UAW realized, through a long
history of good faith bargaining, that their respective goals were not
13. It is "lawful to insist upon matters within the scope of mandatory bargaining and unlaw-
ful to insist upon matters without." Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.
14. An employer who declines to bargain over a permissive issue must be careful not to in-
fringe upon the right of its nonunion employees. The employer may not refuse to bargain in order
to discredit the union. Cf. Textile Workers' Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965)
(finding an unfair labor practice when the employer closed the plant solely to avoid unionization).
15. See Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal Political
Imagination, 97 HARv. L. REV. 475, 478 (1983).
16. 452 U.S. 666 (1981); see also infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
17. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677.
18. Id. at 679.
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necessarily divergent. For example, management and labor realized the
necessity of reaching an agreement that would allow income generated
by the depreciation of the plant to be reinvested in the plant itself, and
not in the opening of other plants in foreign countries. Thus, General
Motors and the UAW ignored the mandatory-permissive distinction for
the Saturn agreement and acted as equal partners attempting to estab-
lish a profitable business venture.
This Special Project Note focuses on the status of the labor-man-
agement relationship resulting from cooperative, concessions-type bar-
gaining and analyzes how, if at all, such a relationship may affect the
future of our present national labor policy. Part II outlines the social
policies behind the NLRA by briefly examining the legislative history of
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d). Part III traces the judicial response to the
NLRA and the effect the judiciary has had on the evolution of Ameri-
can labor law. Part IV presents a hypothetical situation and compares
the effectiveness of three different bargaining environments in resolving
the problem. Finally, Part V concludes that labor-management coopera-
tion is a realistic approach to the collective bargaining process and
breaks down the adversarial barriers inherent in our present bargaining
system.
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The NLRA of 1935, the Wagner Act, was a response to the indus-
trial strife of the 1930s and was designed to stabilize and protect "the
social order of American capitalism."'19 Congress viewed this industrial
anarchy as a result of the economic inequality between management
and labor.20 The Act promoted employee participation in managing the
workplace by establishing employees' rights to form or join labor un-
ions, to engage in collective bargaining, and to partake in concerted ac-
tivity.21 Congress believed that contract law would mediate the
antagonistic interests of labor and management while maintaining the
freedom of the private enterprise.2 2 Therefore, much of the NLRA fo-
19. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 275 (1978).
20. See Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 34-43 (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATM HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS ACT, at 1373, 1410-19 (1949) [hereinafter NLRA HisT.] (statement of Sen. Wagner).
21. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). These rights are commonly referred to as § 7 rights.
22. The NLRA purposefully does not provide for public regulation of contract terms. In fact,
§ 8(d) expressly states that the Board may not require parties to agree to any contract term.
NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See Friedman, Keeping Big Issues off the Table: The
Supreme Court on Entrepreneurial Discretion and the Duty to Bargain, 37 ME. L. REv. 223, 224
(1985).
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cuses on the procedures for establishing efficient collective bargaining.2 3
In order to effectuate equality in bargaining, the Wagner Act con-
tained section 8(5),24 the provision now codified as section 8(a)(5). Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act made an employer's refusal to bargain with the
representative of its employees an unfair labor practice.2 " This provi-
sion codified the duty of employers to make a bona fide effort to reach
an agreement with their employees, and gave substance to the employ-
ees' guaranteed right to bargain collectively.26 Section 8(a)(5) brought
the employer to the bargaining table ready to discuss issues in good
faith, but did not proscribe the guidance needed to determine the
breadth of the employer's obligation to bargain.
23. The preamble to the NLRA expresses Congress' belief in the need for equal bargaining:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some
employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of
industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or ob-
structing commerce ...
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate
or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of com-
merce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing the wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of
competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proven that protection by law of the rights of employees to organize and
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and pro-
motes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and
unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial dis-
putes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restor-
ing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
NLRA, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)) (words in italics
were added by the LMRA (Taft-Hartley Amendments), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)).
24. NLRA § 8(5), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) (as
amended)).
25. Id. The section states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to section 9(a) [current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)] of this title." Id. Section 9(a) of the NLRA codifies the principle that
a representative selected by a majority of employees in a bargaining unit is the exclusive represen-
tative of all of the employees. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). A bargaining unit is a group
of employees that possesses sufficiently similar interests (e.g., functional coherence, collective bar-
gaining history, commonality of interests, and employment desires) to constitute a unit for bar-
gaining purposes. See generally 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 413-17.
26. The legislative history of the NLRA is replete with references to the necessity of estab-
lishing a genuine effort in bargaining. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA
HIsT., supra note 20, at 2336. Senator Wagner remarked:
The very essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to withdraw if its
conditions are not met. But the right of workers to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing must be matched by the correlative duty of employers to recognize
and deal in good faith with these representatives. The Government itself is held up to ridicule
when the elections which it supervises are rendered illusory by failure to acknowledge their
results.
Id.
27. Id. at 2373. Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Labor Committee, also observed:
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Concern arose over the vagueness of section 8(a)(5) because the
NLRA granted authority to the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) to regulate employer interference with employees' statutory
rights,28 without authorizing the Board to police the subject matter of
the collective bargaining contracts. Congress responded to the need for
further definition of the duty to bargain with the 1947 amendments to
the NLRA, often referred to as the Taft-Hartley Amendments. 29 In sec-
tion 8(d) Congress attempted to designate the subjects that would be
the most important topics in the collective bargaining process. Congress
rejected the House proposal for section 8(d), which would have broken
down collective bargaining into five categories.30 Instead, Congress
opted for a more general and flexible statement requiring collective bar-
gaining over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment."31
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) generally have been read together as a
flexible standard capable of adapting to the requirements of future la-
bor-management relations.32 Congress deliberately chose to keep the
limiting language of section 8(d) open ended in hopes of increasing the
use of collective bargaining. This choice reemphasized the original in-
When employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their representa-
tives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer and say, "Here
they are, the legal representatives of your employees." What happens behind those doors is
not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
Id.
28. NLRA § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
29. LMRA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982). Section 8(5) remained substantially the same; only
the section designation was altered. Additionally, the LMRA drafted a corresponding duty to bar-
gain for unions in § 8(a)(3). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents ... to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of
his employees. . . ." NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982).
30. The House bill categorized the five topics of bargaining as:
(i) Wage rates, hours of employment, and work requirements; (ii) procedures and practices
relating to discharge, suspension, lay-off, recall, seniority, and discipline, or to promotion,
demotion, transfer and assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures,
and practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of health at the place of employ-
ment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and (v) administrative and procedural provisions
relating to the foregoing subjects.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA HIST., supra note 10, at 158,
166-67.
31. LMRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982); see supra note 7 for relevant text of this section.
32. The legislative history of the LMRA discussed the need for such flexibility:
What are proper subject matters for collective bargaining should be left in the first instance
to employers and trade-unions, and in the second place, to any administrative agency skilled
in the field and competent to devote the necessary time to a study of industrial practices and
traditions in each industry or area of the country, subject to review by the courts. It cannot
and should not be strait-jacketed by legislative enactment.
H.R. REP. No. 245, MINORry REPORT, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA HIsT.,
supra note 10, at 355, 362.
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tent of the NLRA that all issues of importance to the labor-manage-
ment relationship be sifted through the mediatory procedures of
collective bargaining.
Commentators have noted the difficulty in identifying and articu-
lating the objectives of the NLRA. 3 A pervasive theme throughout the
Act, however, is the congressional desire to promote a peaceful indus-
trial democracy, which supports "actual liberty of contract,"3 by nar-
rowing the inequality of bargaining power between employers and their
workers.3 5 Encouraging labor and management to bargain about those
issues which in turn will bolster the economy, serves the public interest.
From a policy standpoint, therefore, the phrase "other terms and condi-
tions of employment" must be intended to promote affirmative bargain-
ing behavior, not to limit the scope of the bargaining itself. Restricting
the subjects discussed at the bargaining table, before determining
whether those subjects legitimately affect the employer-employee rela-
tionship, does not encourage industrial democracy. Indeed, limiting the
negotiable subjects to those which do not necessitate employer discre-
tion runs counter to the NLRA's stated purpose of maintaining indus-
trial peace by providing employees with a detailed system of collective
bargaining for the purpose of enhancing their status in the workplace."6
Restrictions on bargaining turn the desired flexible standard into "an
33. Kare, supra note 19, at 281. See generally Friedman, supra note 22; George, To Bargain
or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REv. 667 (1985);
Note, Enforcing the NLRA: The Need for a Duty to Bargain over Partial Plant Closings, 60 TEX.
L. REv. 279 (1982).
34. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
35. See Kare, supra note 19, at 281. The author describes six possible statutory goals:
1. Industrial Peace: By encouraging collective bargaining, the Act aimed to subdue "strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest," because industrial warfare interfered with in-
terstate commerce; that is, it was unhealthy in a business economy....
2. Collective Bargaining: The Act sought to enhance collective bargaining for its own sake
because of its presumed "mediating" or "therapeutic" impact on industrial conflict.
3. Bargaining Power: The Act aimed to promote "actual liberty of contract" by redressing
the unequal balance of bargaining power between employers and employees.
4. Free Choice: The Act was intended to protect the free choice of workers to associate
amongst themselves and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective
bargaining.
5. Underconsumption: The Act was designed to promote economic recovery and to prevent
future depressions by increasing the earnings and purchasing power of the workers.
6. Industrial Democracy:. . . Senator Wagner frequently sounded the industrial democracy
theme in ringing notes, and scholars have subsequently seen in collective bargaining "the
means of establishing industrial democracy,. . . the means of providing for the workers' lives
in industry the sense of worth, of freedom, and of participation that democratic government
promises them as citizens."
Id. at 281-84 (quoting Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV.
999, 1002 (1955)).
36. Note, supra note 33, at 301.
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economic weapon for the dominant party" 7 and threaten the very exis-
tence of our labor policies. As the next section of this Special Project
Note demonstrates, the judiciary, in giving some definition to the
vagueness of section 8(d)'s "terms and conditions of employment," has
fashioned its own scope of collective bargaining which has altered the
evolution of labor relations that was envisioned by Congress in 1935
and in 1947.
III. JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
Though the NLRA designates the Board-an administrative
agency designed to be aware of the changing attitudes of industrial
practices-as the regulatory body to monitor the procedures of collec-
tive bargaining, the Act does not pronounce that the Board regulate the
substantive terms of labor agreements. 8 Congress intended that the
Board maintain the framework for discussion while market forces deter-
mine who controls the terms and conditions of employment.3 9 The lais-
sez-faire view of collective bargaining encapsulated in the NLRA
establishes a statutory scheme that affirms and denies the power of the
state to compel bargaining, while simultaneously valuing and limitifig
employee participation in industrial decisionmaking. °
A. NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.
In 1958 the Supreme Court responded to the Act's inherent tension
in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.41 The Board had
found specific managerial proposals to be per se violations of the em-
ployer's duty to bargain with the certified International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(International). Specifically, Borg-Warner concerned a charge that
management had breached its duty to bargain by negotiating to im-
37. Note, The Spring Has Sprung: The Fate of Plant Relocation as a Mandatory Subject of
Bargaining, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 221, 224 (1987).
38. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). Chief Justice Vinson pointed
out that
[t]he National Labor Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging
the making of voluntary agreements governing relations between unions and employers. The
Act does not compel any agreement whatsoever between employees and employers. Nor does
the Act regulate the substantive terms governing wages, hours and working conditions which
are incorporated in an agreement.
Id. at 401-02 (footnotes omitted).
39. Id. at 408-09 (stating that "Congress provided expressly that the Board should not pass
upon the desirability of the substantive terms of labor agreements. Whether a contract should
contain a clause fixing standards for such matters as work scheduling ... is an issue for determi-
nation across the bargaining table, not by the Board ..
40. Note, supra note 15, at 477.
41. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
19881 585
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
passe over two clauses. The first clause required a secret ballot vote of
all employees, union and nonunion, on the company's last proposal
before the union could strike.4 The second clause recognized the
union's local affiliate instead of International as the bargaining repre-
sentative.4" The Court distinguished between subjects specifically ad-
dressed by section 8(d) and all other matters by stating that the law
allows a party to insist on section 8(d) issues as required subjects of
bargaining and does not allow a party to insist on items that fall outside
the scope of the resulting mandatory bargaining framework. 4 In af-
firming the Board's decision, the Court held that while the employer
had bargained in good faith over all elements of the contract proposal,
the employer's insistence on these nonmandatory issues, items outside
of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," as
preconditions to any agreement upon the mandatory subjects specified
in section 8(d) constituted a refusal to bargain.45 As a practical matter,
the Court's approach conditioned the scope of bargaining on the defini-
tion given to "mandatory" and "permissive" subjects. More impor-
tantly, the Court established a precedent for significant judicial and
administrative involvement in determining the subjects discussed in the
bargaining process.
Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Borg-Warner4 6 provides in-
sightful commentary on the potential impact of the majority's ap-
proach. Justice Harlan believed the majority's opinion was
"incompatible with th[e] basic philosophy of the original labor Act.' 14
He stated that the legislative history of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d)
demonstrated that Congress did not intend the Board to regulate the
substantive aspects of the bargaining process, but rather intended to
assure the parties to a proposed collective bargaining agreement the
42. Id. at 345-46.
43. Id. at 345.
44. Id. at 349.
45. Id. Justice Burton reasoned:
The duty [to bargain] is limited to [wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment], and within that area neither party is legally obligated to yield. As to other matters,
however, each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree.
The company's good faith has met the requirements of the statute as to subjects of
mandatory bargaining. But that good faith does not license the employer to refuse to enter
into agreements on the ground that they do not include some proposal which is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining .... This does not mean that bargaining is to be confined to
the statutory subjects. Each of the two controversial clauses is lawful in itself. Each would be
enforceable if agreed to by the unions. But it does not follow that, because the company may
propose these clauses, it can lawfully insist upon them as a condition to any agreement.
Id. at 349 (citations and footnote omitted).




greatest degree of freedom in their negotiations.48 The fundamental
problem with the majority's opinion, according to Justice Harlan, was
that it could impede the development of the collective bargaining sys-
tem by assuming that section 8(d)'s vague language provides sufficient
guidelines for courts to make the mandatory-permissive distinction.49
B. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB
The Board and courts of appeals applied the Borg-Warner major-
ity's approach to many issues in subsequent decisions. Generally, these
duty to bargain cases focused on whether the alleged violation of the
NLRA was relevant to the terms and conditions of employment.8 0 Until
the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
v. NLRB, 51 the courts gave very little attention to the mandatory-per-
missive status of employer rights based on ownership or entrepreneurial
discretion. At issue in Fibreboard was whether an employer's economi-
cally motivated decision to subcontract a portion of its maintenance
work previously performed by bargaining employees of the company
was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although the employer made
the decision solely to reduce labor costs, the Court affirmed the Board's
finding of a section 8(a)(5) violation.5 2 The Court held that the con-
tracting out of work is "plainly" a condition of employment 3 and ac-
knowledged that issues relating to job security should be mandatory
subjects of bargaining in order to promote the NLRA's "fundamental
purpose" of encouraging peaceful settlement of industrial disputes.4
Despite having liberally endorsed a broad construction of the duty to
bargain, the Court made a deliberate effort to limit its decision to the
48. Id. at 356.
49. Id. at 359; see also Friedman, supra note 22, at 240-43.
50. See, e.g., NLRB v. Independent Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443 (8th Cir.) (concluding that griev-
ance procedures are a mandatory subject of bargaining), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979); United
Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150, 156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (deciding that arbitrations are a
mandatory subject of bargaining); Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1968)
(holding that workloads are a mandatory subject of bargaining); NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384
F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967) (finding that plant safety is a mandatory subject of bargaining); NLRB v.
Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1967) (ruling that layoffs are a mandatory subject of
bargaining).
51. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
52. Id. at 209.
53. Id. at 210.
54. Id. at 210-11. The Court stated:
A stipulation with respect to the contracting out of work performed by members of the bar-
gaining unit might appropriately be called a "condition of employment." The words even
more plainly cover termination of employment which, as the facts of this case indicate, neces-





specific type of contracting involved in Fibreboard in which an em-
ployer replaced its own set of employees with another set to perform
identical tasks under similar conditions of employment . 5 Additionally,
the Court stated that the holding would have been different had the
employer's decision involved a major capital investment or change in
basic operations.56  Thus, the majority opinion's definitional ap-
proach-simply saying that subcontracting is a condition of employ-
ment because employees' jobs may be lost-did not offer much
guidance for distinguishing between mandatory and permissive subjects
in cases involving other types of economically motivated business
decisions.5
Disturbed by the breadth of the majority opinion, Justice Stewart
wrote an influential concurrence that sought to define the limits of the
Fibreboard decision.58 Justice Stewart clearly believed that manage-
ment's decisions "which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control"
ought to be protected by limitations on the employer's duty to bar-
gain.5e Under Justice Stewart's analysis, managerial decisions that have
a direct impact on employees' working conditions but are "fundamental
to the basic direction of the corporate enterprise" are excluded from the
mandatory-permissive distinction. 0
C. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB
While admitting in a footnote 1 in Fibreboard that the framers of
the original NLRA might not have intended the courts to get involved
55. Id. at 215.
56. Id. at 213.
57. See George, supra note 33, at 676.
58. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 217 (Stewart, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 223. Justice Stewart stated:
Many decisions made by management affect the job security of employees. Decisions concern-
ing the volume and kind of advertising expenditures... may bear upon the security of the
workers' jobs. Yet it is hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve "conditions of em-
ployment" that they must be negotiated with the employees' bargaining representative....
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collec-
tively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.
Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enter-
prise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of
the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. Justice Stewart's analysis may be summarized by the following passage:
If, as I think clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to the duty of
collective bargaining, those management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direc-
tion of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security
should be excluded from that area.
Id.; see also George, supra note 33, at 678 (dividing management decisions in Justice Stewart's
concurrence into three categories).
61. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 219 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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in defining the duty to bargain, Justice Stewart mused that this view
could no longer prevail because too many decisions were based on a
contrary assumption.2 Carrying on this tradition of judicial legislation,
the Supreme Court in 1981 espoused the modern judicial view of the
limits of mandatory bargaining in First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB.6 3 At issue in First National Maintenance was an employer's
duty to bargain over its decision to terminate part of its business for
economic reasons." First National Maintenance (FNM) provided
housekeeping and maintenance services to commercial customers in ex-
change for labor costs plus a set fee. One of its customers was Green-
park Care Center, a nursing home, for whom FNM had thirty-five
employees providing maintenance. As a result of a financial dispute be-
tween Greenpark and FNM,6 the maintenance services were termi-
nated and the thirty-five FNM employees were laid off. A newly elected
union,66 representing the terminated employees, charged FNM with vio-
lating sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5) for refusing to bargain in good faith
about the partial closure decision. Both the administrative law judge
and the Board found FNM guilty of an unfair labor practice.6
In reversing the Board's holding, the Supreme Court did not defer
to the Board's interpretation of the scope of section 8(d).6 The major-
ity opinion adopted Justice Stewart's analysis in Fibreboard as a foun-
dation for constructing a restrictive view of mandatory bargaining,
moving further away from merely construing the relevancy of the sub-
ject in question to the "terms and conditions of employment." First
National Maintenance, according to the majority, concerned a decision
based solely on the profitability of a contract without regard to contin-
ued employment.70 In order to determine the employer's bargaining ob-
ligation concerning these types of decisions, the Court applied a
62. Id.; see Friedman, supra note 22, at 251.
63. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
64. Cf. Textile Workers' Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965) (stating that
"so far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the absolute right to terminate
his entire business for any reason he pleases, but. . . [not] to close part of a business no matter
what the reason").
65. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 669.
66. Id. The union won an election on March 31, 1977, and attempted to engage in negotia-
tions with FNM on July 12. Id.
67. Id. at 670.
68. 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979), enforced, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
69. Two years prior to First National Maintenance, the Court discussed at length, in Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979), the "considerable deference" due the Board under the
NLRA in its determination of mandatory bargaining subjects. Id. at 495-98.
70. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677. The majority characterized the case as involv-
ing a "management decision ... that had a direct impact on employment, since jobs were inexora-
bly eliminated by the termination, but had as its focus only the economic profitability of the
contract with Greenpark, a concern ... wholly apart from the employment relationship." Id.
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balancing approach whereby bargaining over a subject is mandatory
only if the benefits for labor-management relations outweigh the em-
ployer's need to make decisions freely.71 The Court focused on the
union's lack of control over the disputed fee for maintenance services.
Balancing the opposing interests, the Court determined that an em-
ployer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking over whether to close
down a portion of the business for economic reasons outweighed any
benefits from union participation in the decision. 2 This conclusion was
based on the speculative belief that had the union met with manage-
ment, the union would not have been able to offer concessions that
Greenpark had a duty to consider.73 Such negotiations by the union
only would have delayed the inevitable loss of jobs. 4 Therefore, the
Court reasoned that collective bargaining over a partial closure decision
was of little value when compared to an employer's prerogative in en-
trepreneurial decisionmaking. The Court, in essence, created a per se
rule against requiring bargaining in this situation.75
71. Id. at 679. The Court explained:
[I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over manage-
ment decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment
should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-
bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
Id.
72. Id. at 686. The Court held that "the harm likely to be done to an employer's need to
operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely of economic reasons
outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation in mak-
ing the decision." Id. (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 687-88.
74. Id. at 681.
75. The Court in First National Maintenance focused on whether labor had a statutory right
to bargain with management over the decision to close operations in part. Generally, the employer
must bargain with its employees about the effects of this decision on employee benefits. Effects
bargaining usually is required when a managerial decision could have an adverse impact on em-
ployees' job security. Thus, any management action that may result in layoffs will call for bargain-
ing over the "effects" of the decision, even though the decision itself does not have to be subjected
to the bargaining process. Id. at 681-82; see, e.g., Fraser & Johnston Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 142 (1971),
enforced, 469 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1972).
Additionally, First National Maintenance settled a split in the circuits over the bargaining
obligation of partial closing decisions. Several circuits had found that partial closures were purely
part of the entrepreneurial decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533
F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1976) (dicta); NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698, 703 (10th
Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d 108, 113 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). Other circuits
had maintained a rebuttable presumption that a partial closure required bargaining. See, e.g., ABC
Trans-National Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1981); Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB,
637 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1981); Brockway Motor Trucks, Div. of Mack Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d
720 (3d Cir. 1978).
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D. After First National Maintenance
The Supreme Court carefully restricted its holding in First Na-
tional Maintenance to economically motivated partial closure decisions,
and expressly declined to apply its conclusions to other decisions such
as plant relocations."6 The Court has yet to deal directly with the issue
of plant relocations. A line of Board decisions since First National
Maintenance, however, has relied on its narrow holding to authorize
mandatory bargaining regarding relocation decisions without applying
the First National Maintenance balancing test." In 1984 the Board de-
parted from this line of decisions in Otis Elevator IP by attempting to
apply the First National Maintenance balancing test. Otis Elevator H
concerned an employer's decision to replace outmoded equipment and
duplicative work by consolidating facilities. The Board reasoned that
Otis Elevator's decision to relocate did not require mandatory bargain-
ing because the employer's decision was not based on an attempt to
reduce labor costs and did not invoke section 8(d).79 The Board sug-
gested that a management decision could be viewed as either a change
in the nature of the business, and therefore purely economic, or as a
decision based solely on labor costs. For bargaining to be required
under this approach, labor costs must be the sole consideration in the
management decision.80 While the Board stated that the First National
Maintenance test would apply to Otis Elevator's decision, on balance,
Otis Elevator's relocation decision was purely economic and, thus, was
not the type of business decision that must be negotiated under the
76. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 686 n.22 (stating that "[i]n this opinion we of
course intimate no view as to other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales,
other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered on their particular
facts").
77. See Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurants, 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982) (concluding that the
employer unlawfully refused to bargain about its decision to shut down a shrimp processing opera-
tion and contract out that work to another company); Carbonex Coal Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1306
(1982) (holding that an employer unlawfully failed to bargain about its decision to transfer unit
work); Whitehall Packing Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 193 (1981) (finding that an employer unlawfully failed
to bargain with the union concerning its decision to relocate work to an "alter ego" company); see
also George, supra note 33, at 681-82.
78. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
79. Id. at 892-93. "Whatever the merits of the [relocation] decision, so long as it does not
turn on labor costs, Sec. 8(d) of the Act does not apply." Id. at 892 n.3.
80. Id. at 892-93 (holding that "[tihe critical factor to a determination whether the decision
is subject to mandatory bargaining is the essence of the decision itself, i.e., whether it turns upon a
change in the nature or direction of the business, or turns upon labor costs; not its effect on em-
ployees nor a union's ability to offer alternatives" (emphasis in original)). The Board's analysis
seems to provide only minimal guidance because many management decisions may legitimately
involve both a fundamental change in the business and labor cost concerns. For further application
of the Otis Elevator II analysis, see Columbia City Freight Lines, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 12 (1984). See
also George, supra note 33, at 681-95.
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NLRA.s ' More recently, in the Milwaukee Spring decisions,8 2 the
Board ignored the mandatory-permissive distinction altogether, prefer-
ring instead to focus on the parties' failure to utilize the arbitration
remedies provided for in their contract.8 3 These recent cases illustrate
that since the inception of the First National Maintenance test, the
Board has yet to balance the benefits to labor-management relations
with an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking on a case-
by-case basis. The following section compares managerial and labor in-
terests within various negotiating frameworks to ascertain whether col-
lective bargaining, as conceived by the framers of the NLRA and as
perceived by the Supreme Court, actually can balance the inequality of
bargaining power inherent in private enterprise and broaden the scope
of employee participation in business decisions.
IV. COMPARING THE ALTERNATIVES
The Court in First National Maintenance assumed that little
could be gained from collective bargaining, in terms of enhancing the
labor-management relationship, when an employer is contemplating
shutting down part of its operations for economic reasons. As Justice
Brennan argued in dissent,"4 the Court's analysis may be criticized fur-
ther for balancing entrepreneurial freedom against a process, labor-
management relations, rather than against a genuine employee interest
in workplace management.8 5 For this reason, judges possess broad dis-
cretion in determining which subjects are core entrepreneurial decisions
and which subjects are permissive items of bargaining. The mandatory-
permissive distinction, initially elaborated to encourage bargaining,8
now serves as a means of restricting collective negotiation because the
flexibility of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" hardens
as the list of permissive issues grows.
The desire to protect an employer's incidents of ownership, as well
as to promote an economically healthy industrial environment, has
molded the framework for determining the status of bargaining subjects
within the compelled negotiation process into a set of per se rules
rather than a balancing test. The Saturn project represents an attempt
81. 269 N.L.R.B. at 892-93.
82. United Auto Workers v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Milwaukee Spring II, 268
N.L.R.B. 601 (1984); Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
83. Note, supra note 37, at 230-37.
84. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
wrote: "I cannot agree with this test, because it takes into account only the interests of manage-
ment; it fails to consider the legitimate employment interests of the workers and their union." Id.
(emphasis in original).
85. Friedman, supra note 22, at 259.
86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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by both General Motors and the UAW to resist categorizing various
subjects of bargaining in order to capitalize on the ability of employees
to participate affirmatively in workplace decisions. Thus, the coopera-
tive effort to organize the Saturn project abandons the traditional ad-
versarial attitudes by ignoring the mandatory-permissive distinction in
hopes of preserving the flexibility necessary to allow the labor-manage-
ment relationship to adapt to the specific needs of the subcompact car
market. Such an agreement forces a reevaluation of existing labor policy
by questioning whether the present legal framework, constructed with
acknowledged deference towards the preservation of core en-
trepreneurial decisions, can provide guidance in the future.
To illustrate why the Saturn agreement has been characterized as
"the longest step yet taken [by management] toward full partnership
with labor in every phase of planning and production, '87 this Special
Project Note will analyze a hypothetical situation under three different
collective bargaining frameworks. These frameworks are: (1) a hyper-
bolic scheme in which all permissive bargaining subjects are mandatory;
(2) the current balancing test as elaborated by the Supreme Court in
First National Maintenance; and (3) a labor-management cooperative
venture. The hypothetical concerns Company Z, a large domestic pro-
ducer of goods for an international market. Company Z believes that, to
maximize its competitiveness, it must shut down one of its many facili-
ties and move the facility's machinery to another plant operating in a
state with lower labor costs. The proposed closure of the company's fa-
cility will result in layoffs of many employees represented by a union. 8
A. Mandatory Bargaining
By eliminating the mandatory-permissive distinction, Company Z's
business decision to relocate its facility in order to enhance profitability
would be, by definition, a mandatory subject of bargaining. This deci-
sion, as well as any other managerial judgments, would have to be nego-
tiated through concessions-type bargaining until an impasse occurs.
The lack of restrictions placed on bargainable subjects makes collective
bargaining a vehicle by which employees may play a truly active role in
87. Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 3, at 602 (quoting Raskin, A Sour Note in Industry's
New Harmony, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, at A23, col. 1).
88. The Board recently faced a similar factual scenario in the Milwaukee Spring cases. See
supra note 82. By using a contract modification analysis, the Board avoided determining whether
the relocation of work from a unionized facility and the reassignment of work to nonbargaining
unit employees within the same facility is a mandatory subject of bargaining. For further compara-
tive analysis based upon this hypothetical example, see Note, Worker Participation: Industrial
Democracy and Management Prerogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the
United States, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 93, 133 (1984). See generally infra Special Pro-
ject Note, Comparative Analysis.
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determining workplace conditions. The question remains, however,
whether a mandatory scheme actually would encourage bargaining.
Widening the scope of bargaining to subject all issues to negotia-
tion directly contradicts the philosophical position of the Supreme
Court. By creating a framework in which both labor and management
are compelled to come to the bargaining table prepared not only to dis-
cuss but also to negotiate every issue, collective bargaining, as a means
of ameliorating industrial differences, becomes the focus of atten-
tion-and is pushed to its limits as a result.8 9 One positive aspect of
this situation is that instead of resolving issues surrounding the
mandatory-permissive distinction through litigation, management and
labor could use their respective bargaining powers to gain concessions
from each other on various items of importance.90 Opening up the chan-
nels of communication also would allow for a more honest sharing of
information and options, and perhaps lead to a truer presentation of
both sides' demands. Society as a whole would benefit from an increase
in worker participation in the operation of the workplace because the
resulting, more democratic industrial relationship would encourage a
more productive negotiation process.91
A number of potential problems, however, are associated with a
bargaining framework which dictates that every item is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Because each side is able to wield its respective
economic influences 92 over a broader range of issues, bargaining could
become more complex and more time consuming.9 3 Also, management
or the union may attempt to undermine the other's integrity by insist-
ing on concessions that negate the other's traditional functions. Overall,
the enterprise itself could suffer the most because of management's in-
ability to make quick entrepreneurial decisions.9 4
Applying an entirely mandatory scheme to Company Z's decision
prior to its execution95 could affect greatly the company's outlook on
the situation. If the company is compelled to discuss the closing of the
facility and its relocation with the union, a bargain might be struck en-
89. See Delaney & Sockell, The Scope of Bargaining: Who Wins When Fewer Issues Are
Mandatory Bargaining Subjects, 11 LAB. STUD. J. 101, 106 (1986).
90. See id. at 107-09.
91. Id. at 110.
92. In the case of management, concessions may be drawn from the union representatives
through the implementation of a lockout. The union, depending on the situation, may choose to
strike to force the issue. In either case, such actions would most certainly disrupt production or
increase the price of products. Id. at 112.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 113.
95. Such decisional bargaining is in direct contrast to effects bargaining, which directs man-
agement to bargain with the union after the business decision has been made over any incidental
issues that may arise as a result. See supra note 75.
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abling the plant to remain operational. The basis for the agreement
would be an understanding that the union would lower its labor costs in
exchange for greater job security. Whether or not such an agreement
could be reached, and also be economically feasible, depends on
whether the negotiations are cooperative and realistic."' At a minimum,
every possible alternative would be examined before the company actu-
ally could close the facility.
B. A Balancing Test
By explicitly limiting the holding in First National Maintenance
to a partial closure decision, the Court did not determine whether a
decision to shut down completely and relocate a facility is a mandatory
or permissive subject of bargaining.97 Rather, the Court maintained
that the negotiability of such a decision, or of any issue for that matter,
would depend on weighing various factors regarding the interested par-
ties involved. Under this test, therefore, a balance must be struck be-
tween the burden collective bargaining places on Company Z's
managerial capabilities and the benefits that compelled negotiation be-
stows on the "establishment and maintenance of industrial peace.""8
The application of the mandatory-permissive distinction is, in theory,
the means by which this balance in labor-management relations is
preserved.
Underlying the First National Maintenance standard are the be-
liefs that management must be able to act without the constraints of
collective bargaining in certain situations and that the bargaining pro-
cess cannot resolve every decision.9 In order to determine if a particu-
lar item is capable of being resolved by collective bargaining,"0 a court
must examine industrial practices with a cautious eye and analyze the
effect of the decision on management's ability to operate a profitable
business. If the threat to industrial freedom outweighs the benefit of
subjecting the issue to the bargaining process, the decision, according to
current labor policy, is not a subject about which management should
be compelled to bargain.
Company Z's decision to relocate, when evaluated under the First
National Maintenance approach, probably would not be an appropriate
subject for mandatory bargaining. In balancing the interests of the re-
spective parties, a court probably would conclude that the issues in this
96. Delaney & Sockell, supra note 89, at 112-13.
97. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
98. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 674 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
99. Id. at 678.
100. Id. at 680.
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case are similar to those decided by the Supreme Court in First Na-
tional Maintenance. Both the decision to relocate and the decision to
close part of the business could be characterized as an exercise of man-
agement's private obligation to operate an economically profitable
plant. Although these decisions would have a significant effect on con-
tinued employment, 1 1 a court might hold that the company's relocation
decision is motivated by a desire to effect a change in the direction of
the business unrelated to employment.102 Consequently, a court would
defer to the managerial prerogative if presented with this situation be-
cause the union's participation in the decision would yield only a mini-
mal benefit. 0 3
C. Labor-Management Cooperation
Company Z may choose to include the union as a partner in its
decisionmaking process and ignore the mandatory-permissive distinc-
tion altogether. In contrast to the adversarial structure created by this
distinction, cooperation provides a more open and respectful labor man-
agement bargaining relationship. If, however, the company makes the
conscious policy choice to cooperate with the union in locating its facil-
ity in an area of the country where it may prosper both from an eco-
nomic and human relations standpoint,0 both parties must decide how
cooperative their relationship will be given the current labor policy.
Perhaps the most insightful means by which to understand and solve
this dilemma is to appreciate the precedent General Motors and the
UAW have set with their cooperative orchestration of the Saturn
agreement'05 .
The memorandum of understanding developed between General
Motors and the UAW has been labeled an unprecedented experiment in
terms of total participation, contribution, and commitment by all peo-
ple involved. 06 General Motors and the UAW have set out as partners
to establish a flexible bargaining relationship that will find "practical
ways to solve real problems in order to maximize employment opportu-
nity and preserve an important U.S. manufacturing base."'01 7 In order to
101. Id. at 679.
102. Id. at 677. As a matter of course, most management decisions could be characterized as
being motivated by "purely economic" interests, as opposed to employment-related interests.
103. Id. at 686.
104. Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 3, at 615.
105. The Saturn Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Motors.
106. Address by James L. Lewandowski, Vice President, Human Resources, Saturn Corp.,
The American Society of Personnel Administrators Mid-South Conference, Nashville, Tenn. (Oct.
29, 1987) [hereinafter Lewandowski Address].
107. Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 3, at 615 (quoting E. Hartwig, The Collective Bargain-
ing Process, Address Before Conference on the Labor Board at Mid-Century, Washington, D.C.
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gain a competitive edge in the subcompact car market, General Motors
has chosen to treat the UAW as an asset, not a liability,10 and to capi-
talize on the individual strengths of each party by integrating the union
into the traditional management decisionmaking structure. Union rep-
resentatives participate in the decisionmaking process on issues that
once were closely guarded management prerogatives, including the level
of investment, product design, supplier selection, and manufacturing
and marketing strategy.10 9 Consequently, this organizational structure
establishes a nonadversarial climate that will allow the General Motors-
UAW relationship to grow stronger in the future."0
The General Motors-UAW cooperative agreement was the product
of collective bargaining "based not on an obsolete ideological, adver-
sarial mind set,""' but rather on a utilitarian, participatory scheme
that respected the individual worker's dignity and the general public's
changing needs. Thus, the Saturn pact is exceptional in going beyond
what traditionally has been perceived as appropriate bargaining proce-
dure. Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide the relocation is-
sue, it probably would be a permissive bargaining subject. Technically,
General Motors was obligated only to bargain with the UAW about the
possible effects the relocation decision would have on employees who
already were represented by the union. 12 Instead of bargaining about
the effects of this decision as it related to their existing contractual re-
lationship, General Motors and the UAW collaborated on the new Sat-
urn agreement by bargaining over the decision itself." s The bargaining
(Oct. 4, 1985)).
108. The NLRB released a statement that summarized the goals and consequences of the
Saturn agreement as follows:
In the case of the Saturn Project, the evidence clearly indicated that the venture, whether or
not it is successful, will have an impact on current GM small-car manufacturing facilities, and
consequently on the job security of GM employees represented by the UAW. Both GM and
UAW recognized this potential and therefore bargained with each other about the effects of
the Saturn project on current employees represented by UAW. One result of that bargaining
was the agreement to give such employees an opportunity to transfer to the Saturn facility.
UAW sought this agreement for the benefit of the employees it represented, while GM sought
this agreement in order to provide the Saturn Corporation with an immediate source of em-
ployees skilled in automobile manufacturing.
NLRB General Counsel Orders Dismissal of Charges Regarding UAW-GM Saturn Pact, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at A-4 (June 4, 1986) (LEXIS, Labor library, DLABRT file).
109. Lewandowski Address, supra note 106, at 10.
110. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 3, at 615.
111. Id. (quoting E. Hartwig, supra note 107).
112. See generally supra note 75.
113. Letter from Rossie D. Alston, Jr. Attorney for the National Right to Work Legal De-
fense Foundation, to Rosemary Collyer, General Counsel, Division of Advice for the NLRB (July
16, 1986) (discussing the NLRB's Division of Advice's justifications for refusing to issue a com-
plaint in the Saturn case) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). Counsel for the charging
party, Alston, contended that General Motors and the UAW had no right or prerogative to bargain
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relationship established by this agreement is revolutionary because em-
ployees are participants in the enterprise rather than simply laborers in
the production process. 114 In this cooperative setting, the distinctions
drawn between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects, origi-
nally developed to encourage fruitful collective bargaining, have not
only become hazy but also, from a practical perspective, have become
meaningless because the demarcations between the goals of both labor
and management purposefully have been removed.
Following the path forged by the Saturn agreement would seem to
be a precarious endeavor because, though the signs point toward the
familiar destination of a profitable enterprise, the surroundings appear
nontraditional and, therefore, foreboding. If Company Z chooses to in-
clude the union in its decisionmaking process, the defined structure of
the collective bargaining process will have to be replaced by consensus-
type bargaining, which focuses discussion on the perceived problems in
the future relationship, not on the bargaining status of the individual
issues.1 5 The aim of such a cooperative effort would be to enhance the
stability of the enterprise by meshing entrepreneurial innovation and
job security. In this setting, and in light of the developments in today's
competitive world market, the judicially perceived need for the public
protection of industrial freedom, from which the mandatory classifica-
tion originated, would appear to be antiquated, indeed, even detrimen-
tal. In order for a labor-management cooperative venture to be
successful, however, both parties must be willing participants who are
committed to seeing the project through to its designed end. If for some
reason the willingness of the parties should wane in the midst of their
cooperative effort, perhaps the more familiar mandatory-permissive
bargaining surroundings could serve as a useful guide by which to ap-
pease the resulting antagonistic bargaining relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
The framers of the NLRA envisioned collective bargaining as an
organic system of procedures aimed at resolving the friction that is
seemingly inherent in the workplace. The Act was designed to be a pac-
ifying framework for achieving peace in an antagonistic, potentially vio-
lent, societal relationship. In order to allow this bargaining system to
over a totally new agreement "unless and until a representative complement of the employees [had
been] actually hired." Id. at 4. Additionally, Alston maintained that Division of Advice's finding
that the Saturn agreement was composed of the "fruits" of effects bargaining was "to render
meaningless all of the legal underpinnings of. . . Section 8(a)(2)." Letter, supra at 5; see supra
note 75. See generally supra Special Project Note, Future Cooperative Efforts.
114. Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 3, at 615.
115. Id. at 611.
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operate as a vital mediating tool, the framers purposefully refrained
from enacting any rigid guidelines that might restrict communication.
The Act embodies a policy view that flexible public control of com-
pelled bargaining will ensure that individual employers and their em-
ployees have the freedom necessary to tailor the collective bargaining
process to the particular needs of their industry.
The Court did not judicially impose the mandatory-permissive dis-
tinction to constrain the scope of bargaining. Rather, the Court wanted
to encourage bargaining by declaring that certain subjects are so inte-
gral to the employer-employee working relationship that they must be
negotiated to impasse and cannot be avoided through subversive bar-
gaining. As the courts decide which issues are mandatory and which are
permissive, however, the scope of permissive bargaining grows in the
name of entrepreneurial protection, and the flexibility and effectiveness
of the collective bargaining process decrease dramatically.
Cooperative efforts such as the Saturn agreement are private re-
sponses to the traditionally adversarial, autocratic labor-management
relationship. The pressures of foreign competition are challenging the
management philosophies of our domestic industries. Including union
representatives in management's decisionmaking structure is an innova-
tive means by which to optimize the individual strengths of a company.
Within this cooperative setting, the courts should not draw an artificial
distinction between different subjects of bargaining in an attempt to
protect the interests involved.116 The Saturn project and ventures like it
capitalize on the similarities and differences of both labor's and man-
agement's perspective to increase the profitability of the enterprise.
Thus, the General Motors-UAW cooperative relationship demonstrates
that industrial democracy, the heralded goal of collective bargaining,
not only fosters industrial peace but also promotes economic prosperity.
Thomas T. Crouch
116. Id.
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